Community Magazine January 2014

52 COMMUNITY MAGAZINE Freddie owns a chain of retail stores within walking distance of each other. Every morning, Freddie instructs his workers to load the merchandise he needs transported between stores onto a platform hand truck. One morning, while the loaded hand truck was stationed in front of the store, one of the customers exiting the store accidentally pushed it, sending it rolling down the sloping sidewalk. The hand truck hit Avi’s car, breaking the back headlights. Avi, who was standing in the vicinity, began to holler at the customer, and after he received her identification, he proceeded to demand that Freddie, the store owner, compensate him for the damage. Avi claimed that Freddie was responsible for the damage to his car, since his hand truck was freely parked in a public domain. Freddie refused to pay, explaining that he parked that hand truck a thousand times in front of the store and never had a problem. He insisted that the lady who pushed the hand truck was the cause of the damage and was thus responsible to pay. The three appeared in Bet Din to resolve the matter. Who is liable to pay for the damage to Avi’s car – Freddie or the customer, or neither? According to the ruling of the Shulhan Aruch, one who unintentionally pushes an obstruction found in a public domain bears liability for the consequential damage caused by his actions. Although the obstruction was placed by its owner in the public domain, nevertheless, if somebody recklessly pushed the object, that person is liable for all damages. Since the object was set into motion by an unwarranted thrust, the owner of the obstruction bears no liability. However, this ruling applies only if the object was pushed by an unusual motion which should not be made in a public domain. But if a pedestrian pushed the object in the normal course of walking, he is exempt from payment. By Torah law, one is not liable for damages caused while walking normally in a public domain, as one is not expected to be constantly watching out for obstacles lying in his path. And thus if a pedestrian pushed an object while walking normally, it is the object’s owner, who should not have placed the object in a place where it could easily be moved by pedestrians, who bears liability. Although the passerby sent the obstacle into motion and thus caused the damage, nevertheless, he did so due to circumstances beyond his control, and the burden of responsibility is cast upon the one who originally placed the obstruction. A platform hand truck on wheels that is stationed on a sloping sidewalk would certainly appear to be an obstacle which can easily roll and cause damage. Hence, a passerby who unintentionally bumps into such a vehicle over the course of normal walking is exempt from the consequential damage, and the liability is borne by the truck’s owner, who placed it in a public domain. It should be noted that this ruling applies even if the obstacle is large and easily discernable to the general public, as a person while walking is usually involved in thought, and cannot be expected to look out for obstacles which do not belong in a public domain. Naturally, this ruling is subject to the specific variables of the incident in question. The weight of the merchandise on the truck and the speed of the wheels play a role in determining whether the passerby pushed it in a reckless manner, or if he innocently bumped into it. Likewise, witnesses can generally testify as to whether the pedestrianwalked in an inappropriatelywild and uncontrolled manner through the public domain. A Bet Din will issue its ruling only after gathering all the available information pertinent to the case. It should be noted that if the area is designated specifically for loading and unloading merchandise, then a pedestrian who moves the vehicle is liable for any consequent damage. Since the area is not a public walkway, a pedestrian is required to proceed with caution while walking. Generally speaking, though, public sidewalks are designated as walkways, and thus pedestrians who push something while innocently walking on a sidewalk would not bear liability for damages. ON WHEELS Rabbi Max Sutton, Rosh Bet Din Aram Soba, Jerusalem, Israel FROM THE FILES OF THE Bet Din Torah Law photo by: Abraham Amzalak The Case Verdict: ROLLING THUNDER After gathering all the specific details of the incident, our Bet Din submitted a verdict requiring Freddie to pay Avi for the damage to his car. After determining that the wheels of the platform hand truck were well-greased, in addition to viewing photographs of the minimal amount of merchandise on the truck at the time of the accident, it became evident that the truck should not have been unattended. These factors evidently played a role in the truck being moved so easily. Witnesses came forward testifying that the woman who accidentally pushed the truck was casually exiting the store, and by no means acted in an uncontrolled manner. In fact, the hand truck was stationed in her blind spot, making it nearly impossible for her to avoid it as she exited to her right. And thus Freddie, who had the hand truck dangerously stationed in front of his store, is liable, as the unfortunate incident was foreseeable in light of the circumstances. The fact that he stationed the hand truck on many other instances without mishap is not a reason for exemption from liability. The freshly-greased wheels and lightweight merchandise on the truck, as well as the exact position of the truck at the time of accident, are all variables which are subject to change, explaining why this may have been a first-time occurrence. And, in fact, when the judges of the Bet Din visited the site of the accident, one of the workers whispered to them that this was not the first time the hand truck rolled down the sloping sidewalk as Freddie claimed. (The worker was unwilling to testify in Bet Din out of fear of losing her job.) While the Bet Din could not include her testimony in its decision, it nevertheless served as an indication that our evaluation, with the help of Gd, was indeed accurate. Endnotes: Baba Kama 6a, Tosafot s.v. le’atuyeh; Shulhan Aruch Hoshen Mishpat 411:1,3, 4, Sema 411:6; Baba Kama 27b; Tosafot and Rashba to Baba Kama 27b; Tosefta, Baba Kama 6:13; Shulhan Aruch 378:1; Mishpat Shelomo 1:100; Pit’hei Hoshen 5:8; 6.